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Abstract
We study the contribution of health-related behaviors to the health educa-
tion gradient by distinguishing between short-run and long-run mediating effects:
while in the former only behaviors in the immediate past are taken into account,
in the latter we consider the entire history of behaviors. We use an empiri-
cal approach that addresses the endogeneity of education and behaviors in the
health production function. Focusing on self-reported poor health, we find that
education has a protective effect for European males and females aged 50+. We
also find that the mediating effects of health behaviors - measured by smoking,
drinking, exercising and the body mass index - account in the short-run for 17%
to 31% and in the long-run for 23% to 45% of the entire effect of education on
health, depending on gender.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between education and health - the “education gradient” - is widely
studied. There is abundant evidence that a gradient exists (Cutler and Lleras-Muney
(2010)). Yet less is known as to why education might be related to health. In this
paper we explore the contribution of health-related behaviors (shortly, behaviors) -
which we measure with smoking, drinking, exercising and the body mass index1 - to
the education gradient. To do so, we decompose the gradient into two parts: a) the
part mediated by health behaviors; b) a residual, which includes for instance stress
reduction, better decision making, better information collection, healthier employment
and better neighborhoods (Lochner (2011)).2
We are not the first to investigate the mediating role of health behaviors. Our
contribution is two-fold: first, we distinguish between short-run and long-run mediat-
ing effects. Typically, the empirical literature considers only the former and focuses
either on current behaviors or on behaviors in the immediate past, thereby ignoring
the contribution of the history of behaviors. By ignoring this history, short-run me-
diating effects are likely to underestimate the overall mediating effect of behaviors
whenever there is some persistence in the health status. Second, as recently pointed
out by Lochner (2011), a problem with the existing empirical literature is that most
contributions fail to address the endogeneity of education and behaviors in health re-
gressions and therefore ignore that there are possibly many confounding factors which
influence both education and behaviors, on the one hand, and health outcomes, on
the other hand. While some studies have dealt with endogenous education, our ap-
proach is novel because we address the endogeneity of both education and behaviors
in the health production function, and therefore can give a causal interpretation to
our estimates.
1Conditional on exercising, drinking and smoking, the body mass index essentially captures the
effects of poor diets and low intake of fruit and vegetables, two key behaviors affecting health (see
Cawley and Ruhm, 2011). We use the body mass rather than these behaviors because of lack of
suitable data.
2The residual also includes the contribution of unmeasured behaviors.
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Our identification strategy is based on aggregation, differencing and selection on
observables (ADS) and allows us to estimate average education effects for an individ-
ual randomly picked from the population. Using a cross-country dataset, in which we
observe a rich set of parental and early life information, this strategy combines selec-
tion on observables and fixed effects assumptions to estimate the parameters of both
a dynamic health equation, which depends on education and lagged health behaviors,
and a static health equation, where health depends only on education. The effect of
education on health in the second equation is the education gradient (shortly, the gra-
dient), i.e. the total effect of education on health that results from both mediated and
residual effects of education. The identification strategy we propose presents signifi-
cant improvements with respect to a strategy simply based on selection on observables
since it removes the effect of all unobserved factors that are on average common within
clearly defined cells.
To corroborate the internal validity of our identification approach, we contrast these
estimates of the health education gradient with those obtained with a completely dif-
ferent methodology, instrumental variables (IV) estimation, where the key exogenous
variation is provided by the changes in compulsory schooling laws across countries and
birth cohorts. While the IV strategy generates causal estimates that are internally
valid for individuals affected by mandatory schooling laws (compliers), it cannot be
used for the decomposition of the education gradient because of the lack of valid and
relevant instruments for behaviors.
We apply this approach to a multi-country dataset, which includes 13 European
countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) and provides informa-
tion on education, health and health behaviors for a sample of males and females aged
50+. By focusing on older individuals, we consider the long-term effects of education
on health. These data are drawn from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE) and from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). Both
surveys are modeled following the US Health and Retirement Study.
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Focusing on self-reported poor health as health outcome, we find that education
has a protective effect, both for males and females, although the effects for females
are typically somewhat higher. When evaluated at the sample mean of the dependent
variable, one additional year of education reduces self-reported poor health by about
7% for females and 3% for males. These effects are smaller than those found by others.
Our explanation is that we use a sample of older individuals (50+) than typically done
in the literature, and that the protective role of education on health declines with age.
Our qualitative findings are robust to the choice of the identification strategy.
We show that health behaviors - measured by smoking, drinking, exercising and the
body mass index - contribute to explaining the gradient. The size of this contribution
is larger when we consider the entire history of behaviors rather than only behaviors
in the immediate past. In the former case, we find that the effects of education on
smoking, drinking, exercising and eating a proper diet account for 23% to 45% of
the entire effect of education on health, depending on gender. In the latter case, the
mediating effects are about 17% for females and 31% for males. The largest part of
the gradient, however, remains unexplained. Potential candidates accounting for this
part include direct effects of education on health as well as indirect effects operating
through unobserved health behaviors, wealth and cognitive abilities.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a brief review of the relevant lit-
erature. The theoretical model is presented in Section 3, and our empirical strategy
is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 describes the data. The empirical results are
discussed in Section 6. Conclusions follow.
2 Review of the Literature
As recently reviewed by Lochner (2011), empirical research on the causal effect of
education on health has produced mixed results. This literature typically focuses on
single countries and identifies the effect of education on health with the exogenous
variation generated by mandatory schooling laws. Most of these studies consider self-
reported health as well as other outcomes. Some find that education improves health,
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see for instance Adams (2002), Mazumder (2008) and Oreopoulos (2007) for the US,
Arendt (2008) for Denmark, Kempter et al. (2011) for German males and Silles (2009)
and Oreopoulos (2007) for the UK. Others find small or no effects. While Clark and
Royer (2010) find very small effects for Britain, ambiguous or no effects are obtained
by Albouy and Lequien (2009) for France, Arendt (2008) for Denmark, Braakmann
(2011), Juerges et al. (2009) and Powdthavee (2010) for the UK and Kempter et al.
(2011) for German females. Overall, the existing literature is inconclusive.
There are many possible channels through which education may improve health.
Lochner (2011) lists the following: stress reduction, better decision making and infor-
mation gathering, higher likelihood of having health insurance, healthier employment,
better neighborhoods and peers and healthier behaviors.3 The contribution of be-
haviors, which include smoking, drinking and eating calorie-intensive food, has been
examined in the economic and sociological literature, starting with the contribution
by Ross and Wu (1995).4 These authors use US data, regress measures of health
on income, social resources and behaviors and treat both behaviors and education as
exogenous. They find that behaviors explain less than 10% of the education gradient.
Cutler et al. (2008) discuss possible mechanisms underlying the education gradient.
Using data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) in the US, they find
that behaviors account for over 40% of the effect of education on mortality in their
sample of non-elderly Americans. A problem with these studies is that they fail to
consider the endogeneity of education and behaviors in a health equation which in-
cludes both. In the study closest to this paper, Contoyannis and Jones (2004) partly
address this concern by explicitly modeling the optimal choice of health behaviors.
They jointly estimate a health equation - where health depends on education and be-
haviors - and separate behavior equations - where behaviors depend on education -
by Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML), treating education as exogenous.
Using Canadian data, they show that the contribution of lagged (7 years earlier) be-
3Conti et al. (2010) argue that non-cognitive skills may be an important factor as well.
4See the reviews by Feinstein et al. (2006) and Cawley and Ruhm (2011).
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haviors to the education gradient varies between 23% to 73%, depending on whether
behaviors are treated as exogenous or endogenous.
We summarize the existing evidence as follows: first, the available empirical evi-
dence on the causal effect of education on health is mixed and covers a rather limited
set of countries (Denmark, France, Germany, the UK and the US); second, the esti-
mated contribution of behaviors to the education gradient varies substantially across
the few available studies, depending on model specification and identification strategy.5
We contribute to this literature in several directions. First, we distinguish explicitly
between the short-run and long-run mediating effects of health behaviors. While the
former only includes the effects of behaviors in the immediate past, the latter takes
into account the contribution of the entire history of behaviors. This qualification is
empirically relevant, as we show in Section 6. Furthermore, our study is the first to
cover a substantial number of European countries (13), using a multi-country dataset
which includes also Southern European countries, which have not been studied before.
We are also the first to offer an identification strategy - aggregation, gender differencing
and selection on observables (ADS) - which addresses the endogeneity of both educa-
tion and health behaviors in the health production function. The assessment of the
health education gradient obtained relying on this approach proves to be broadly very
similar to the estimate obtained relying on a a more conventional -and widely accepted-
IV strategy, which exploits the exogenous variation in education across countries and
cohorts induced by changes in mandatory schooling. We interpret this as supportive
evidence for the causal interpretation of our main results.
3 Contribution of Health Behaviors to the Educa-
tion Gradient
In the empirical literature (Ross and Wu (1995) and Cutler et al. (2008)) the contribu-
tion of health behaviors to the education gradient (HEG) is evaluated by adding the
5See also Stowasser et al. (2011) for a discussion of causality issues in the relationship between
socio-economic status in general and health.
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vector of either current behaviors (B) - which include smoking, the use of alcohol or
drugs, unprotected sex, excessive calorie intake and poor exercise - or of behaviors in
the immediate past (first lag) to a regression of (poor) health status H on education
E and other covariates. The lag is often justified with the view that the impact of
health behaviors on health requires time. Consider the following empirical model
Hit = ct + αt−1Bi,t−1 + βtEi + νit (1)
where i is the individual, t is time, c is a constant and v is the error term. We assume
stationarity in the parameters (ct = c; αt−1 = α; βt = β). Behaviors themselves depend
on education. The education gradient α∂Bt−1
∂Ei
+β can be decomposed into: a) the effect
operating via health behaviors lagged once Bt−1, or α
∂Bt−1
∂Ei
; b) the residual effect β. As
reviewed by Lochner (2011), channels through which education may improve health
without affecting behaviors include stress reduction, better decision making, healthier
and safer employment, healthier neighborhoods and peers. The ratio between the effect
operating via health behaviors and the overall effect measures the relative contribution
of health behaviors in the immediate past to the education gradient.
To illustrate with an example, assume that the instantaneous utility function is given
by U(Cit, Bit, ηit)−h(E)Hit, where η is a vector of unobservables affecting preferences,
and let ρ be the discount factor and pt the price of the bundle of goods not affecting
health.6 As shown in the Appendix, the maximization of the inter-temporal utility
function subject to the health production function (1) and the budget constraint yields
the vector of optimal behaviors Bit = B(Ei, pt, ρ,Xit, ηit), where X is a vector of
exogenous covariates. Ignoring for the time being the price vector p, the discount
factor and the vector X, a linear approximation of behaviors is
Bit = σ0 + σ1Ei + ηit (2)
6The price of the bundle of goods affecting health, which include risky health behaviors B, is
normalized to one. The utility function does not take into consideration habit formation mechanisms.
An extension which deals with the effects of these mechanisms on behaviors is left to future research.
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Substituting (2) into (1) yields
Hit = (c+ ασ0) + (ασ1 + β)Ei + αηit + νit (3)
In this example, the education gradient HEG is given by (ασ1 + β) and the relative
contribution of behaviors in the immediate past to the gradient is ασ1
(ασ1+β)
.
3.1 The History of Behaviors
By focusing on behaviors in the immediate past, specification (1) assumes that, con-
ditional on Bit−1, earlier behaviors do not contribute to current health. To illustrate
the implications of this assumption, let the ”true” health production function be given
by
Hit = k0 + k1Bit−1 + k2Bit−2 + ...+ kTBit−T + θEi + εit (4)
where we assume again stationarity in the coefficients. This function is more general
than (1) because current health depends both on behaviors lagged once and on all
previous lags from (t − 2) to the initial period T . Using the instantaneous utility
function introduced above and ignoring again the price vector p, the discount factor
and the vector X, a linear approximation of optimal behaviors is given by equation
(2), which combined with (4) yields
Hit = [k0 + σ0(k2 + ...+ kT )] + k1Bit−1 + [σ1(k2 + ...+ kT ) + θ]Ei + υit (5)
where υit = εit +
T∑
s=2
ksηit−s.
When the health production function depends on the entire sequence of risky health
behaviors, from period 1 to T , the contribution of behaviors in the immediate past
to the education gradient is σ1k1
[σ1(k1+k2+...+kT )+θ]
, where the denominator includes both
the effect of education on health conditional on behaviors θ and the mediating effects
of behaviors. This contribution differs from the contribution of the entire sequence
of health behaviors from lag 1 to T , which is given instead by σ1(k1+k2+...+kT )
[σ1(k1+k2+...+kT )+θ]
. If
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the parameters ki are positive, ignoring the contribution of higher lags leads to an
underestimation of the overall mediating effect of risky health behaviors.
When the available data do not include information on behaviors from lag t− 2 to
lag T , as it happens in our case, an alternative approach is to adopt a dynamic health
equation (see for instance Park and Kang (2008))
Hit = d+ piBit−1 + νEi + φHit−1 + eit (6)
which requires data only for periods t and t − 1. Under the additional assumptions
that Ht−T = 0, φ < 1 and T → ∞, equation (6) is equivalent to equation (4) when
the following restrictions on the parameters hold
k1 = pi; k2 = piφ; ks = piφ
s−1,∀s = 3, . . . , T ; θ = ν
1− φ ; k0 =
d
1− φ ; εit =
eit
1− φ
Since equation (6) can be written as equation (4) and we retain the same instanta-
neous utility function, the linear approximation of optimal health behaviors in equation
(2) is unchanged.7 Using this approximation into (6), we obtain
Hit =
d+ φpiσ0
1− φ + piBit−1 +
[
ν + φσ1pi
1− φ
]
Ei + eit (7)
where eit =
T−1∑
k=0
φkεit−k + pi
T−1∑
k=1
φkηit−k−1. Furthermore, placing Bit = σ0 + σ1Ei + ηit
into (7) yields the “reduced form” health equation
Hit = χo + χ1Ei + e˜it (8)
where χo =
piσ0+d
1−φ , e˜it =
T−1∑
k=0
φk(εit−k+ηit−k−1) and χ1 = piσ1+ν1−φ is the education gradient
HEG.
7We ignore again prices, the vector X and the discount factor.
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The relative contribution of health behaviors in the immediate past Bit−1 to the
education gradient (short-run mediating effect, SRME) is
SRME =
(1− φ)piσ1
(piσ1 + ν)
(9)
The overall relative contribution of health behaviors (or long-run mediating effect,
LRME) to the education gradient adds to the contribution of health behaviors in the
immediate past the contribution of previous behaviours, from t − 2 to t − T, and is
equal to
LRME =
piσ1
(piσ1 + ν)
(10)
This implies that SRME = (1 − φ)LRME. Under these assumptions, for any
φ > 0, SRME under-estimates LRME, and the degree of under-estimation is larger
the higher is φ (persistence of health status over time). Therefore, if we only estimate
SRME, we may find a small contribution of health behaviors to the overall education
gradient not because health behaviors have a small mediating effect but because we
have ignored the contributions of health behaviors from period t− 2 to t− T .8
3.2 Estimating Short- and Long-Run Mediating Effects
One of the aims of this paper is to provide estimates of SRME and LRME. Our
empirical strategy is based on the estimation of the parameters of the dynamic health
equation (6) and the “reduced form” health equation (8). Using these estimates, we
can compute
piσ1 = χ̂1(1− φ̂)− ν̂ (11)
and
L̂RME =
χ̂1(1− φ̂)− ν̂
χ̂1(1− φ̂)
(12)
8If the overall education gradient HEG is negative, sufficient conditions for the indicator LRME
(SRME) to fall within the range [0, 1] are piσ1 ≤ 0 and ν ≤ 0. If HEG is positive, these conditions
also change signs.
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ŜRME = (1− φ̂)L̂RME (13)
This strategy has the advantage that it only requires the estimation of two equations
and the drawback that we cannot separately identify the mediating effect of each single
health behavior. For that, we would need to estimate also equations such as (2) for
each available behavior. We leave this development for future research.
4 Empirical Strategy
We start this section with the following assumptions on the error terms e in the dy-
namic health equation (6) and η in the behavior equation (2):
eit = fi + ξit; ηit = gi + ζit (14)
(ξit, ζit) ⊥ (ξik, ζik) for all j 6= k | fi, gi, X,Ei, Bit (15)
E[ξit|fi, gi, X,Ei, Bit] = 0 E[ζit|fi, gi, X,Ei, Bit] = 0
E[fi|Ei] 6= 0 E[fi|Bit−1] 6= 0 E[fi|Hit−1] 6= 0 (16)
E[gi|Ei] 6= 0 (17)
Each error term is composed of a time invariant individual effect (either f or g in
equation (14)) and a strictly exogenous transitory serially uncorrelated effect (either ξ
or ζ). Conditional on f, g, E and B and the vector X of exogenous variables, transitory
effects are uncorrelated (Eq.(15)) and have zero mean (Eq.(16)). Education, behaviors
and lagged health are correlated to the errors e and η only via their correlations with
the individual effects f and g, i.e. we do not assume that these effects are independent
of Ei, Bit, Hit−1.9
9In our set-up, individual effects could be regarded as random without loss of generality given that
we are interested in partial regression coefficients holding these individual effects constant. We regard
(Hit, Ei, Bit, Hit−1, X, fi, gi) as a random sample from an artificial multivariate population with joint
distribution p(Hit, Ei, Bit, Hit−1, X, fi, gi) = p(Hit|Ei, Bit, Hit−1, X, fi, gi)p(Ei, Bit, Hit−1, X, fi, gi)
and focus on the conditional distribution of Hit.
11
Since optimal education depends on the unobservables that affect preferences (η)
and health production (e) - see the illustrative example in the Appendix - ordinary
least squares estimates of the health production function fail to uncover causal rela-
tionships. A similar problem affects the OLS estimates of the “reduced form” health
equation, because health depends both on education and on the sequence of shocks
affecting preferences and health production (see equation (8)). An important draw-
back of the empirical studies investigating the mediating effect of health behaviors on
the education gradient is that they fail to consider the endogeneity of education and
behaviors (Lochner (2011)). In this paper, we address these problems in an attempt to
give a causal interpretation both to the gradient and to the mediating role of behaviors.
In the past few years, several papers have estimated the causal effect of educa-
tion on health using the exogenous variation in educational attainment generated by
compulsory schooling laws. This instrumental variables (IV) approach can be used to
estimate the “reduced form” health equation (8). In principle, the same approach can
also be applied to the dynamic health production function (6), provided that we can
find additional credible sources of exogenous variation which affect risky health behav-
iors without influencing individual health (conditional on behaviors). This is a very
difficult task with the data at hand.10 Therefore, we turn to an identification strategy
that combines aggregation, fixed effects and selection on observables to estimate both
the dynamic health production function and the “reduced form” health equation.11
For the latter equation, we compare the results obtained following this approach to
those obtained with a more conventional IV approach, using changes in compulsory
education as instrument for education and provide additional evidence supporting the
causal interpretation of our main results. We illustrate these two approaches in turn.
10Using instruments such as the price of alcohol or cigarettes does not work in our setup because
these variables influence all cohorts in one country alike.
11Card and Rothstein (2007) use a similar method to investigate ethnic segregation in US schools
and its impact on the black-white test score gap.
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4.1 Aggregation, Differencing and Selection on Observables
Estimating the dynamic health equation (6) by OLS gives biased estimates if education
and health behaviors are correlated with unobservable characteristics affecting health.
To illustrate the endogeneity problem, consider unobserved ability. While this variable
is omitted from the regression, it might influence current health and it is likely to be
correlated with our variables of interest, education and lagged behaviors. We address
this problem by combining aggregation, differencing and selection on observables. In
short, we aggregate our data into cells defined by gender, cohort, country and time
period (two waves of data). By doing so, we average out individual unobserved id-
iosyncracies. We difference data by gender to eliminate all those unobservables which
are shared by males and females in each cell and capture residual gender-specific un-
observables with observable controls, which include a rich set of parental and early life
conditions.
More in detail, consider the following empirical version of the dynamic health pro-
duction function
Hicgbt = αg0 + αg1Bicgb(t−1) + αg2Eicgb + αg3Xicgb + αg4Hicgb(t−1) + f˜icgb + ξicgbt (18)
where i denotes the individual, c the country, g gender (M: males; F: females), b
the birth cohort, t calendar time, X a vector of control variables and we allow each
explanatory variable to have a gender-specific effect on health. The error term in
equation (19) can be decomposed as follows
f˜icgb + ξicgbt = fcgb + ξcgbt + icgbt (19)
where fcgb + ξcgbt represent a common error component for individuals of the same
country c, gender g, birth cohort b and time t and icgbt is an individual-specific id-
iosyncratic error component for which we assume
E[icgbt|c, g, b, t] = 0 (20)
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We aggregate individual data into cells identified by country, gender, birth co-
hort and time and obtain the aggregated health equation (21), where Hcgbt denotes
E[H|c, g, b, t] and similarly for the other key regressors E,Bt−1, X,Ht−1
Hcgbt = αg0 + αg1Bcgb(t−1) + αg2Ecgb + αg3Xcgb + αg4Hcgb(t−1) + fcgb + ξcgbt (21)
Furthermore, we take gender differences for each cell (∆ =females - males) and define
αs = αFs − αMs, with s = 0, .., 4. We obtain
∆Hcbt = α0 + αM1∆Bcb(t−1) + α1B
F
cb(t−1) + αM2∆Ecb + α2E
F
cb + αM3∆Xcb + α3X
F
cb+
+αM4∆Hcbt−1 + α4H
F
cbt−1 + ∆fcb + ∆ξcbt (22)
where the superscript F refers to females. In this specification, αM1 and α1 + αM1
are the effects of health behaviors lagged once for males and females respectively.
Similarly, the gender gap in the ”returns” to education is given by coefficient α2.
12
Differencing by gender eliminates all unobserved factors that are common to males
and females for a given country c and birth cohort b, including genetic and envi-
ronmental effects, income components, medical inputs and the organization of health
care.13 Even after eliminating common unobservables, however, one may argue that
the residual error component ∆fcb could still be correlated with education and lagged
health behaviors. This could happen, for instance, if health conditions and parental
background during childhood differ systematically by gender or if labor market discrim-
ination affects individual income and access to health care, conditional on educational
attainment. In this case, ∆fcb would differ from zero and may drive the endogeneity
12To avoid confusion, we stress that ∆ξcbt is the difference between ξcbFt and ξcbMt, not the differ-
ence between ξcbFt (ξcbMt) and ξcbFt−1 (ξcbMt−1), i.e. we are taking differences between genders in a
given calendar time, not differences within gender over time.
13See Zweifel and Breyer (1997).
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of E, Bt−1 in the health equation. To remove this potential correlation, we model this
residual as
∆fcb = ψb + ψc + ψM1∆Zcb + ψ1Z
F
cb + ψM2∆Y cb + ψ2Y
F
cb + κcb (23)
where ψs = ψFs − ψMs, with s = 1, 2, ψb includes cohort dummies and country-
specific linear or quadratic trends in birth cohorts, ψc is a vector of country dummies,
Z a vector of observables, which includes a rich set of parental background character-
istics and health conditions during childhood14 and Y is real income. Our identifying
assumption is that, conditional on these variables which capture gender-specific ge-
netic and environmental effects, the error term κcb is orthogonal to levels and changes
in health behaviors and educational attainment.15 For the sake of brevity, we call this
method ADS (aggregation cum differencing cum selection on observables).
Our identifying assumptions would only be violated if there are residual omitted
factors which affect gender differences in health, education and behaviors after having
conditioned for country and cohort effects as well as for gender differences in early life
conditions. We can hardly think about good examples of such factors.
Going back to the illustrative example at the beginning of this section, suppose
that the key unobservable in (21) is latent time invariant average ability. The ADS
method assumes that part of this latent factor is common across genders and can
be differenced out.16 The residual gender-specific component is captured by cohort
and country dummies as well as by gender differences in parental background during
childhood and initial health conditions.
14There is a growing literature on the impact of childhood health on adult economic outcomes
(Banks et al. (2011), Smith (2009) and Brunello et al. (2012)). The vector Z includes: childhood
poor health, hospitalization during childhood, presence of serious diseases, had at most 10 books at
home at age 10, mother and father in the house at age 10, mother or father died during childhood,
number of rooms in the house at age 10, had hot water in the house at age 10, parents drunk or had
mental problems at 10, had serious diseases at age 15, born in the country.
15The inclusion of cohort and country dummies in (23) implies that cohort and country effects may
differ by gender.
16With respect to the standard fixed effect model we assume that the conditional distribution of
the individual fixed effect given (Ei, Bit, Hit−1, X) is common between genders. Other than this the
conditional distribution is left unrestricted and the inference is conditional on this effect.
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Conditional on our identifying assumptions, equation (22) is estimated by weighted
least squares, using as weight
(
1
NM
+ 1
NF
)−1
, where NM and NF are the number of
males and females in each cell (see Card and Rothstein, 2007).
4.2 The IV approach
As an alternative approach, we estimate the “reduced form” health equation (8) by
instrumental variables, using the number of years of compulsory education Y C as
instrument for individual schooling years E. This strategy is widely considered as
credible and has been used extensively in the literature (see Lochner, 2011 for a review).
As in Brunello et al. (2009), Brunello et al. (forthcoming) and Fort et al. (2011), we
apply this strategy to a multi-country setup and exploit the fact that school reforms
have occurred at different points in time in several countries.
For each country and reform included in our sample, we construct pre-treatment and
post-treatment samples by identifying for each reform the pivotal birth cohort, defined
as the first cohort potentially affected by the change in mandatory years of schooling.
We include in the pre- and post-treatment samples all individuals born either before,
at the same time or after the pivotal cohort. By construction, the number of years
of compulsory education Y C “jumps” with the pivotal cohort and remains at the new
level in the post-treatment sample. The timing and intensity of these jumps varies
across countries, and we use the within country exogenous variation in the instrument
to identify the causal effects of schooling on health.
We include in equation (8) country fixed effects, cohort fixed effects and country-
specific linear or quadratic trends in birth cohorts. These trends account for country-
specific improvements in health that are independent of educational attainment.17 On
the other hand, country fixed effects control for national differences both in reporting
styles and in institutions affecting health.
Notice that the older cohorts in our data are healthier than average, having survived
until relatively old age. Since the comparison of positively selected pre-treatment
17“Failure to account for secular improvements in health may incorrectly attribute those changes to
school reforms, biasing estimates toward finding health benefits of schooling.” (Lochner (2011), p.41)
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individuals with younger post-treatment samples is likely to result in a downward bias
in the estimates, we control for this selection process by including cohort fixed effects.
5 Data
The estimation of the “reduced form ” and the dynamic health equation requires data
on health outcomes, risky health behaviors, education, parental background and early
socio-economic and health conditions. The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE), the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) and their retro-
spective interviews satisfy these requirements. SHARE is a longitudinal dataset on the
health, socio-economic status and social relations of European individuals aged 50+,
and consists of two waves - 2004/5 and 2006/7 - plus a retrospective wave in 2008/9
(SHARELIFE), covering several European countries - Austria, Belgium, Switzerland,
Denmark, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, The Netherlands and Sweden.18
ELSA has similar characteristics and covers England.19 Since education is typically
accumulated in one’s teens or twenties, by focusing on individuals aged 50+ we are
considering the long-run effects of education on health.
The measure of health used in this paper is self-reported poor health (SRPH), a
dummy equal to 1 if the individual considers her health as fair or poor and to 0 if she
considers it as good, very good or excellent. This is a subjective and comprehensive
measure of health, which is conventionally used in the applied literature (Lochner
(2011)). One may object that self-reported information is likely to be dominated by
noise and may fail to capture differences in more objective measures of health.20 This is
not the case here: among the individuals in the sample who reported poor health, 46%
were diagnosed with hypertension, 69% with cardiovascular diseases and 79% suffered
some long-term illness. On average, they had 2.44 chronic diseases certified by doctors.
18The Czech Republic, Poland, Israel and Ireland joined in the second wave.
19For England, we use waves 2 (2004/5) and 3 (2006/7).
20For an early discussion about the importance of measurement error in self-reported health see
Bound (1991) and Butler et al. (1987) as well as Baker et al. (2004). These authors were primarily
concerned with the impact of measurement error in equations determining the impact of health
on retirement and other labor market outcomes. Justification bias, i.e. non-working persons over-
reporting specific conditions, is an obvious problem there.
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In contrast, the percentage of individuals in good health with similar diseases was 28,
44 and 33 percent, respectively. Moreover, the latter group experienced only 1.10
chronic diseases.21
While our data contain information on chronic diseases, which can be argued to be
more objective than self-reported health, we have chosen to focus on the latter in order
to be able to compare our results with the bulk of estimates in the relevant literature.22
However, we also present in the robustness section of this paper estimates based on
the number of chronic diseases.
We measure educational attainment with years of education. The second wave of
SHARE provides information on the number of years spent in full time education. In
the first wave, however, participants were only asked about their educational quali-
fications. Thus, for the individuals participating only in the first wave, we calculate
their years of schooling using country-specific conversion tables. In ELSA, years of
education are computed as the difference between the age when full-time education
was completed and the age when education was started.
The ADS strategy used in this paper requires that there is gender variation in edu-
cational attainment and self-reported health. Figure 1 documents that such variation
exists: using our cell aggregation approach, the figure shows gender differences by cell
in education and self reported poor health. The two variables are negatively correlated
(slope coefficient of the weighted regression: -0.027; standard error: 0.006).
We have four measures of risky health behaviors: whether the individual is currently
smoking, whether he or she drinks alcohol almost every day, whether he or she refrains
from vigorous activity and the body mass index (BMI). Conditional on the first
three measures, the body mass index captures the effects of poor diets and low intake
21Peracchi and Rossetti (forthcoming) use anchoring vignettes with SHARE and find that gender
differences in self-reported health are somewhat reduced. As these vignettes are asked only in eight
countries and not in the general SHARE survey, we refrain from extending our analysis to these
vignette comparisons.
22While self-perceived health is a comprehensive health measure, specific chronic diseases capture
only part of individual health. Previous studies have shown that self-perceived health and future
mortality are strongly correlated - see Heiss, 2011 for the US and Boppetal, 2012 for Switzerland.
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of fruit and vegetables, two key behaviors affecting health.23 Table 1 reports the
country averages of the health outcome SRPH, years of education and annual income
(thousand euro at 2005 prices, PPP) in 2006/07 as well as the means of the four health
behaviors (in 2004/05), separately by gender.24
There is important cross-country and cross-gender variation, both in the outcome
and in health behaviors. As expected, both income and years of education are higher
among males aged 50+ than among females of the same age group. The percentage
of females reporting poor health is higher than that of males (32 versus 27 percent).
Females are less likely to smoke and drink than males. They have a slightly lower body
mass index (26.7 versus 27.1) and tend to exercise vigorously less often than males.25
As discussed above, we use the ADS approach to estimate the dynamic health
equation (6) and both the ADS and the IV approach for the “reduced form” equation
(8). The estimation of the dynamic health equation requires information on the current
and the previous period. The two waves of SHARE and ELSA used in this paper
include individuals who appear in both waves and individuals who are interviewed only
in a single wave. We compute cell averages at time t and t− 1 by using all individuals
rather than only the longitudinal subsample. Each cell is defined by gender, country,
wave and semester of birth. We use semesters rather than years to increase the number
of available cells in the estimation26, and retain those cells that include at least two
observations. We use data from 12 countries, all of which have participated in at least
two waves in the surveys.
We implement the IV approach by selecting 7 countries where the individuals in
our sample experienced at least one compulsory school reform: Austria, the Czech
23Smoking, drinking alcohol, exercising and diet are among the seven listed factors that affect
individual health by the World Health Organization - the remaining three being low fruit and vegetable
intake, illicit drugs and unsafe sex.
24The Table does not include the Czech Republic because the ADS strategy cannot be applied to
this country, where a single wave of data is available.
25Table B.1 in the Appendix reports the country averages of the parental background variables
included in the vector Z. The table shows that the between genders variations in parental back-
ground and childhood characteristics are small: we interpret this as suggestive evidence that parental
background characteristics are substantially removed by gender differencing, since - within country
and cohort - they are largely common between males and females, on average.
26Since we do not have information on the month of birth for England, we aggregate by year of
birth for this country.
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Republic, Denmark, England, France, Italy and the Netherlands.27 A short description
of the compulsory school reforms used in this paper can be found in Appendix C. Since
the “reduced form” equation (8) is static, we can use individuals who participated in
at least one of the two first waves. When available, we measure the key variables
(health, education) using the information provided by individuals during their second
interview. For those who did not participate to the second wave, we use the first wave.
6 Results
This section describes the results of our empirical analysis and is organized as follows:
first, the baseline estimates of the ADS model for the “reduced form” and the dynamic
health equation are presented. Next, we discuss in Section 6.2 the reduced form esti-
mates based upon the IV approach. Finally, the ADS estimates of the “reduced form”
health equation are compared to the IV results (Section 6.3). Section 6.4 concludes
with several robustness checks.
6.1 Baseline Estimates of the Reduced Form and Dynamic
Health Equations
As reviewed in Section 2, most of the earlier contributions to this literature fail to
consider the endogeneity of education and health behaviors in the health regressions.
For the sake of comparison with this literature, we start the illustration of our empirical
findings with estimates of the “reduced form” and the dynamic health equations based
on micro data. We use a linear probability model, treat education and behaviors as
exogenous, and regress self-reported poor health on years of education and a vector
of variables, which varies according to whether we consider the “reduced form” or the
dynamic health equation and whether we include parental and early life controls or
not.
27We include the Czech Republic in the IV estimates of the reduced form model because these
estimates only use a single wave of the data, which is available also for this country. We exclude
Germany and Sweden because school reforms in these countries were implemented at the regional level
and our information on the region where the individuals completed their education is not accurate.
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For each regression, we pool males and females but allow for the full set of interac-
tions of each explanatory variable with a gender dummy. Preliminary testing suggests
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that cohort, country, time and early life
effects do not vary by gender.28 We therefore report only the estimates with micro
data in which country, cohort, time and early life effects do not vary by gender.
Table (2) is organized in two columns, one for the “reduced form” and the other for
the dynamic health equation, which includes health behaviors lagged once, the first
lag of health and current income. In the “reduced form” equation the marginal effect
of one additional year of schooling on poor health is equal to −0.017 for females and
to −0.012 for males, a relatively small effect when compared to the existing literature
for Europe, which points to an effect in the range −0.026 to −0.081 (Lochner (2011),
Table 6). This difference can be explained, at least in part, if the education gradient
declines with age, given that our sample consists of individuals aged 50+ and the
samples used in the literature typically include also younger individuals. Coefficients
of parental and early life conditions, including poor health at age 10, are statistically
significant and point in the expected direction: poor health conditions at 10 or 15 as
well as poor parental environments at early ages increase self-perceived poor health at
age 50+. Importantly, the inclusion of these variables reduces the gradient by 15 to 20
percent with respect to a more parsimonious specification without early life controls
(not shown in the table), which suggests that these variables capture at least in part
the positive correlation between educational attainment and unobserved individual
effects such as ability and initial health.
Turning to the dynamic health equation, we find that our measures of risky health
behaviors have statistically significant coefficients, with predictable correlations: smok-
ing, refraining from vigorous activity and poor diet leading to higher BMI are positively
related to self-perceived poor health. Somewhat unexpectedly, however, drinking alco-
hol almost every day is negatively related to self-reported poor health, both for males
28The joint hypothesis is not rejected at the 5 percent level of confidence (p-value: 0.094). We
tested separately also the null that the following effects are common between genders: cohort effects
(p-value: 0.894), country effects (p-value: 0.42), background variables (p-value: 0.263), trends in
cohorts (p-value: 0.112) and we never reject the null at conventional significance levels.
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and females. Annual real income is negatively associated to perceived poor health.
Finally, the lagged dependent variable has a coefficient close to 0.5 (but statistically
distinct from 1), which suggests that self-reported health is persistent over time.
Adding health behaviors, income and lagged health reduces the coefficient of ed-
ucation from −0.017 to −0.006 for females, and from −0.012 to −0.005 for males.
Assuming that the returns to education for the sample of countries under study is
equal to 0.0729, the estimated mediating effect of behaviors lagged once is 16.8% for
females and 9.7% for males - see Table 3. In the long run, when we include the effect
of earlier health behaviors, the mediating effect almost doubles to 32.3% for females
and 18.9% for males, suggesting that considering only their first lag may substantially
underestimate the contribution of health behaviors to the education gradient. Our
estimated long-run effects are smaller than those found by Cutler et al. (2008), who
use a different approach but conclude that measured health behaviors account for over
40% of the education gradient (on mortality) in a sample of non-elderly Americans.30
Although the inclusion of parental and early life controls in our regression is likely
to attenuate the correlation between education, health behaviors and unobservables,
there is no guarantee that this correlation will disappear entirely. In order to identify
the causal impact of education on health and behaviors, we apply the ADS procedure
discussed in Section 4.1, which combines aggregation and gender differentiation with
selection on observables. The specification tests carried out on the micro data suggest
that cohort, country and early life effects do not differ significantly by gender. As a
consequence, when we take gender differences of cell data, these common effects are
removed together with common unobservables.
Our results for the ADS model are shown on the right-hand side of Table 2, both
for the “reduced form” and for the dynamic health equation. When we consider the
former, we find that the overall effect of education on poor health is negative and larger
29See for instance the estimates in Brunello et al. (2009). Adding income to equation (6) implies
that LRME is equal to piσ1
(piσ1+ν+qρY )
, where q is the coefficient of income in the dynamic health
equation, ρ is the estimated return to education and Y is average income.
30These authors estimate a static health equation, which includes income and occupation among
the explanatory variables, and use the following measures of health behaviors: current smoker, ever
smoker, number of cigarettes per day, obesity, regular exercise and use of seat belts always.
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in absolute values for females (−0.026) than for males (−0.010). Parental and early
life variables are jointly statistically significant (p-value: 0.009), mainly because of the
gender differences in poor health at age 10. Turning to the dynamic health equation, we
find that the effect of education conditional on behaviors is much smaller (−0.015 for
females and −0.003 for males) than in the “reduced form”. While the precision of the
estimates of the effects of behaviors declines in the cell data with respect to the micro
data, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that these effects are jointly statistically
significant. Finally, income effects are insignificant and the persistence of self-reported
poor health over time is substantially reduced with respect to the estimates based on
micro data.
Aggregation and differentiation increases the absolute value of the overall education
gradient for females from 0.017 to 0.026 but has limited effects on the gradient for
males, which marginally declines in absolute values from 0.012 to 0.010. The short-run
and the long-run mediating effects of health behaviors are also affected. As shown in
Table 3, when compared to the estimates based on micro data, the long-run mediating
effect for males declines in absolute value (from 0.007 to 0.004) but increases as a
share of the gradient (from 18.9 to 44.5%). The opposite happens for females, for
whom this effect increases in absolute value from 0.005 to 0.006 but declines as share
of the gradient (from 32.3% to 22.8%).
In sum, when we explicitly take into account the endogeneity of education and health
behaviors, we find that the long-run mediating effect of the latter ranges between 23
(for females) and 45% (for males) of the total education gradient. While the effect of
education on behaviors accounts for an important share of the gradient, much remains
to be explained, either by the role played by unmeasured behaviors or by effects that
do not involve behaviors, such as better decision making, stress reduction and more
health-conscious peers.
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6.2 IV Estimates of the Reduced Form Health Equation
In this section, we present the estimates of the“reduced form”health equation obtained
using instrumental variables. We instrument education with the number of years of
compulsory education, which varies across countries and cohorts because of compulsory
schooling reforms. For each country, we construct a sample of treated individuals, who
have experienced a change in compulsory education, and a control sample, with no
change in compulsory schooling. Since our data include only individuals aged 50+, we
need to focus on school reforms which took place between the 1940s and the 1960s,
and to restrict our attention to a sub-sample of 7 countries affected by these reforms.
Table 4 shows the selected countries, the years and the content of the reforms as well
as the pivotal cohorts, i.e. the first cohorts potentially affected by the reforms (see
Appendix C for a short description of the education reforms used in this paper).
In order to ensure that individuals spent their schooling in their host country, we
restrict our sample to individuals, who participated in the first or second wave of
SHARE (second or third wave in ELSA), and were born in the country or migrated
there before age 5. Additionally, we control for country fixed effects, cohort fixed effects
as well as for some individual characteristics (whether the individual is foreign-born,
whether there was a proxy respondent for the interview and indicators for the interview
year). We capture smooth trends in education and health by adding country-specific
polynomials in cohorts. In particular, we estimate two specifications, one with a linear
trend and one with a quadratic trend.
Since the key identifying assumption that changes in average education within coun-
try can be fully attributed to the reforms is more plausible when the window around
the pivotal cohort is small, we estimate our model using two alternative samples, one
including individuals who were born up to 10 years before and after the reforms and
another where the relevant window is +7,-7. The two samples consist of 15,960 and
12,294 individuals respectively. Table 5 shows summary statistics by country for the
larger sample.
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Table 6 presents our estimates of the health-education gradient for both males and
females. We report OLS, 2SLS, ITT (Intention-To-Treat, i.e. the effect of compulsory
schooling on health), first stage and IV-Probit estimates for both samples, using two
alternative specifications for the country-specific trends (linear or quadratic). The
OLS estimates of the gradient are −0.024/− 0.025 for females and −0.017 for males.
The estimated magnitude of the gradient increases with instrumental variables: we
find that one additional year of schooling decreases the probability of poor health
by 4 − 8.5 percentage points for females and by 5 − 6 percentage points for males,
depending on the selected window. IV-Probit estimations yield very similar results.
The IV strategy works well: our first stage regressions show that the instrument is
relevant and not weak (F-Statistics between around 13 and 42) and that one additional
year of compulsory schooling increases actual schooling by a quarter to a third of a
year, broadly in line with previous findings in the literature using similar identification
strategies. We interpret the IV estimates as Local Average Treatment Effects, i.e.
the effects of schooling on health for the individuals affected by the reforms. These
individuals typically belong to the lower portion of the distribution of education.
6.3 IV and ADS Results Compared
Next, we compare the education gradients estimated with the IV and the ADS ap-
proaches (Table 7). For the IV approach, we report the estimates with the linear
trend specification and the larger window (±10). We find that education reduces
self-perceived poor health by 4 and 4.8 percentage points for females and males re-
spectively. The ADS approach yields smaller estimates - in absolute values - for females
(2.6 percentage points) and especially for males (1 percentage point).
Since the two approaches are based on a different set of countries and cohorts, we
re-estimate the ADS model for the same sample used in the IV approach. The results
are shown in the last column of Table 7. The magnitudes of the ADS estimates on this
new sample increase somewhat, to 2.8 percentage points for females and to 2 for males,
but remain smaller in absolute value than the IV estimates. To explain this difference,
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we notice that, while IV estimates are Local Average Treatment Effects, i.e. the causal
effects of education on health for the individuals affected by the compulsory schooling
reforms, the estimates obtained with the ADS approach pertain to a randomly drawn
individual from the entire sample. If the protective effect of education on health
is more pronounced for persons with lower education, this would explain the higher
magnitudes obtained with the IV approach.
6.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, we focus on the ADS approach and consider several robustness checks.
We start by collapsing data by gender, country and year rather than semester of birth.
By doing so, we reduce the sample size by almost a half. As shown in the first two
columns of Table 8, the effect of education on health is virtually unaffected for females
but declines for males.31 Next, we omit England to take into account that English data
are drawn from a different (although quite similar) survey and can only be collapsed
by year of birth. The next two columns of Table 8 show that the education gradient
changes only marginally. However, when we decompose the gradient into the effect
mediated by behaviors and the residual effect, we find that the LRME in this sub-
sample is smaller than in the full sample, and is equal to 8.5% and 11.1% of the
gradient for females and males respectively.32
Furthermore, we notice that the older cohorts in our data are strongly selected
by mortality patterns.33 To control for this, we add to the regressions the level and
the gender difference of life expectancy at birth, which vary by country, gender and
birth cohort. Since these data are not available for Greece34, we are forced to omit
31We do not restrict our attention to individuals interviewed in both waves to build the pseudo-
panel.
32We have also estimated our equations on two sub-samples of countries, based on their proximity
to the Mediterranean Sea, but cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are not
statistically different.
33Age in our sample ranges from 50 to 86.
34We use data on life expectancy at birth from the Human Mortality & Human Life-Table
Databases. The databases are provided by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research
(www.demogr.mpg.de). The data are missing for some cohorts and for Greece. We use period mea-
sures of life expectancy at birth since cohort measures are not available for all the cohorts considered
in the study.
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this country from the sample. As displayed by the last two columns in the table,
life expectancy is never statistically significant in the “reduced form” health equation,
and only marginally significant (at the 10% level of confidence) in the dynamic health
equation. We conclude that adding this variable does little to our empirical estimates.
We also run our estimates for the sub-sample of individuals aged 50 to 69 and find
that one additional year of schooling reduces self-reported poor health by 22.4% for
females and by 11.5% for males. These percentages are closer to those found in the
literature. Since survivors aged 70 to 86 might be better educated and might experience
a stronger protective role of education on health than the average individual in the
same age group - i.e. they might have a higher education gradient - it is unlikely that
the decline of the gradient with age is driven by selection effects.
One may think of several factors affecting changes in the education gradient by age
group. On the one hand, the gradient could decline among older individuals because
cognitive abilities decline with age. On the other hand, the effect of behaviors on
health accumulates over time, which should increase the gradient with age. At the
same time, one may speculate that differences by education increase with age because
the older care more about their health. While these factors go in different directions,
our empirical results suggest that their balance is tilted in favor of the first.
Finally, we consider an alternative and more objective measure of health outcome,
the number of chronic diseases. While this number is reported by interviewed indi-
viduals, it is conditional on screening, i.e. each condition must have been detected
by a doctor. Table 9 presents both the ADS estimates of the “reduced form” and
the dynamic health equation, and the IV estimates of the “reduced form”. Using the
ADS method, we find evidence of a negative and statistically significant gradient for
females (−0.057) and of a positive, small and imprecisely estimated gradient for males
(0.012). The directions of these effects are confirmed but their magnitudes in abso-
lute values are larger (−0.157 for females and 0.080 for males) when we apply the IV
method. Defining P (D) as the probability of reporting a condition, this probability
is the product of the probability of undergoing screening P (S) and the probability of
having a disease conditional on screening, P (D|S). We speculate that in the case of
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males the positive effect of education on the number of diseases may be driven by the
fact that better educated males choose more intensive screening.
Turning to the decomposition of the gradient into the mediating effect of behaviors
and the residual effect, we find that SRME and LRME for females are equal to 16.5
and 28.1 percent respectively, not far from the effects estimated for self-reported poor
health. In the case of males, the estimated parameters do not meet the conditions for
both SRME and LRME to be well defined within the range [0, 1].
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the contribution of health behaviors to the education
gradient by distinguishing between short-run and long-run mediating effects: while in
the former only behaviors in the immediate past are taken into account, in the latter
we consider the entire history of behaviors. We have proposed a strategy to estimate
and decompose the education gradient which takes into account both the endogene-
ity of educational attainment as well as the endogenous choice of health behaviors.
This strategy combine aggregation, gender differencing and selection on a broad set of
observables.
Our results show that one additional year of schooling reduces self-reported poor
health by about 7% for females and by about 3% for males.35 These effects are smaller
than those found in comparable empirical literature. We have argued that this dis-
crepancy can be due to the fact that our sample consists of senior individuals aged
50+ and that the gradient declines with age.
Health behaviors - measured by smoking, drinking, exercising and the body mass
index - contribute to this gradient. We find that the long-run mediating effect of
behaviors accounts for 23% to 45% of the entire effect of education on health, depending
on gender. This contribution is reduced in a significant way - especially for males -
if we only consider behaviors in the immediate past, as usually done in the empirical
35The elasticities are evaluated at the sample mean value of self-reported health (0.367 for females
and 0.316 for males).
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literature. Using a completely different strategy - instrumental variables estimation -
we find corroborating results for the education gradient.
Since the gradient is key to understanding inequality in health and life expectancy
and is also used to assess overall returns to education (Lochner (2011)), it is important
to understand the mechanisms governing it. Many of the discussed health behaviors
are individual consumption decisions, changes thereof come at personal costs, e.g.
abstaining from smoking or drinking good wine. Increases in health achieved by such
costly changes in behavior have, thus, to be distinguished from changes resulting from
the free benefits of education, such as lower stress or better decision making. This
distinction is relevant for political decisions about subsidizing schooling. If individuals
are aware of the health-fostering effects of schooling and these are private, then there
is no room for public policy. If individuals are unaware of these benefits, the case for
public policy is stronger if the health benefits of schooling are primarily free rather than
being based on the costly health behavior decisions of individuals (Lochner (2011)).
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Figure 1: Gender differences in education and self-perceived poor health at time t.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, baseline estimation sample (micro data), males (M)
and females (F).
Country Self-rep poor health Education Income Age Obs
M F M F M F M F M F
Austria 0.27 0.31 11.04 9.47 18.74 10.74 65.14 66.18 260 364
Belgium 0.24 0.29 12.36 11.55 16.09 10.82 65.24 65.59 905 1044
Denmark 0.21 0.26 11.25 10.98 16.34 13.02 64.57 65.68 385 399
England 0.28 0.29 11.26 11.20 20.67 14.25 67.50 67.35 1673 2050
France 0.32 0.38 12.17 11.29 23.53 14.04 65.36 66.35 486 638
Germany 0.29 0.35 13.58 12.23 24.50 8.57 65.23 63.69 310 342
Greece 0.19 0.25 9.49 8.16 14.95 6.90 65.10 64.78 717 801
Italy 0.38 0.50 8.08 7.11 13.07 6.55 66.42 65.16 602 722
Netherlands 0.26 0.29 11.88 11.23 22.92 11.29 65.33 64.66 526 599
Spain 0.39 0.52 7.99 7.50 13.65 5.52 67.30 66.44 364 458
Sweden 0.22 0.26 11.42 11.61 16.81 13.00 65.94 65.38 512 615
Switzerland 0.12 0.18 12.25 10.68 29.89 14.10 66.01 64.85 197 232
All 0.27 0.32 11.02 10.37 18.66 11.17 66.03 65.86 6937 8264
Country Smoking−1 Drinking−1 No vigorous exercise−1 BMI−1
M F M F M F M F
Austria 0.21 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.64 0.73 27.46 26.94
Belgium 0.37 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.61 0.75 26.95 26.06
Denmark 0.37 0.20 0.31 0.28 0.48 0.52 26.49 25.57
England 0.22 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.75 0.81 27.81 28.15
France 0.52 0.24 0.19 0.09 0.59 0.73 26.57 25.74
Germany 0.26 0.11 0.21 0.14 0.44 0.43 26.83 26.04
Greece 0.18 0.03 0.36 0.20 0.60 0.67 27.11 26.73
Italy 0.60 0.29 0.25 0.14 0.65 0.74 27.11 26.56
Netherlands 0.38 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.52 0.54 26.26 26.17
Spain 0.45 0.11 0.29 0.10 0.63 0.74 27.62 27.98
Sweden 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.20 0.48 0.60 26.55 25.53
Switzerland 0.34 0.19 0.24 0.19 0.48 0.57 25.78 24.76
All 0.32 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.61 0.70 27.07 26.72
Notes: The upper panel refers to the second wave of SHARE/third wave of ELSA in 2006/07 and
the lower panel refers to the first wave in SHARE/second wave in ELSA in 2004/05. The Czech
Republic is excluded because only one wave is available for this country.
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Table 2: Baseline Results - Micro and ADS Model
Micro-estimates ADS-model
Reduced form Dynamic HE Reduced form Dynamic HE
Females
education -0.017 -0.006 -0.026 -0.015
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
self-rep poor healtht−1 0.479 0.246
(0.012)*** (0.046)***
drinkingt−1 -0.025 -0.013
(0.012)** (0.053)
smokingt−1 0.052 -0.034
(0.012)*** (0.056)
No vigorous 0.032 0.040
exerciset−1 (0.009)*** (0.042)
BMIt−1 0.007 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.004)
incomet -0.000 -0.002
(0.000)** (0.001)
Males
education -0.012 -0.005 -0.010 -0.003
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)* (0.005)
self-rep poor healtht−1 0.486 0.308
(0.014)*** (0.046)***
drinkingt−1 -0.041 -0.062
(0.010)*** (0.038)
smokingt−1 0.030 0.043
(0.011)*** (0.042)
No vigorous 0.049 0.089
exerciset−1 (0.009)*** (0.041)**
BMIt−1 0.006 0.011
(0.001)*** (0.005)**
incomet -0.000 -0.001
(0.000)** (0.001)
Early life
few books in HH 0.043 0.022 0.053 0.040
(0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.035) (0.033)
serious diseases at 15 0.017 0.004 0.028 0.004
(0.008)** (0.007) (0.036) (0.035)
poor health at 10 0.117 0.062 0.158 0.135
(0.014)*** (0.012)*** (0.052)*** (0.049)***
hospital at 10 0.032 0.025 0.004 0.042
(0.016)** (0.014)* (0.063) (0.061)
Principal components
parents drunk or had 0.036 0.018 0.011 0.025
mental problems at 10 (0.009)*** (0.008)** (0.039) (0.038)
parental absence at 10 0.011 0.007 -0.008 -0.009
(0.011) (0.009) (0.039) (0.037)
poor housing at 10 0.016 0.013 0.023 0.014
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.017) (0.016)
Observations 15,201 15,201 736 734
Notes: Country and cohort fixed effects as well as country-specific quadratic trends in cohorts are
included in the first two columns. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1-percent,
5-percent and 10-percent level.
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Table 3: Decomposition - Micro and ADS Model
Females Males
Micro-model ADS-model Micro-model ADS-model
Health-Education Gradient (HEG) -0.017 -0.026 -0.012 -0.010
- behaviors (short-term) -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
- behaviors (long-term) -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004
- residual (direct effect) -0.012 -0.020 -0.010 -0.006
Mediating effect as fraction of HEG
- SRME (short-term) 0.168 0.172 0.097 0.308
- LRME (long-term) 0.323 0.228 0.189 0.445
Notes: Computations based on the estimates reported in Table 2.
Table 4: Compulsory schooling reforms in Europe
Country Reform Years of Compulsory Education Pivotal Cohort
Austria 1962/66 8 to 9 1951
Czech Republic 1948 8 to 9 1934
1953 9 to 8 1939
1960 8 to 9 1947
Denmark 1958 4 to 7 1947
England 1947 9 to 10 1933
France 1959/67 8 to 10 1953
Italy 1963 5 to 8 1949
Netherlands 1942 7 to 8 1929
1947 8 to 7 1933
1950 7 to 9 1936
Table 5: Summary Statistics IV - Sample 10
Country Self-rep poor health Education Compulsory Edu Age Obs
Austria 0.233 11.363 8.237 58.971 782
Czech Republic 0.418 12.026 8.535 63.304 2,452
Denmark 0.208 11.802 5.642 59.194 1,898
England 0.373 10.713 9.585 72.355 4,672
France 0.331 11.324 8.275 63.668 2,223
Italy 0.337 8.822 6.032 59.631 2,093
Netherlands 0.338 10.613 8.263 69.95 1,840
All 0.339 10.901 8.088 65.588 15,960
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Table 6: Health-Education Gradient - IV approach
Sample 10 Sample 7
lin-trend qu-trend lin-trend qu-trend
Females
OLS -0.024 -0.024 -0.025 -0.025
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
2SLS -0.040 -0.064 -0.041 -0.085
(0.024)* (0.034)* (0.035) (0.032)***
ITT -0.014 -0.017 -0.011 -0.023
(0.008)* (0.008)** (0.009) (0.008)***
First Stage 0.344 0.253 0.263 0.271
(0.053)*** (0.058)*** (0.053)*** (0.058)***
IV-Probit -0.042 -0.057 -0.041 -0.073
(0.022)* (0.025)** (0.032) (0.017)***
F-Stat (First Stage) 41.93 18.95 24.89 21.66
Observations 8,602 8,602 6,631 6,631
Males
OLS -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
2SLS -0.048 -0.054 -0.062 -0.064
(0.029)* (0.029)* (0.029)** (0.034)*
ITT -0.016 -0.018 -0.020 -0.020
(0.009)* (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.010)**
First Stage 0.323 0.318 0.313 0.298
(0.076)*** (0.078)*** (0.079)*** (0.082)***
IV-Probit -0.047 -0.051 -0.056 -0.057
(0.024)** (0.022)** (0.019)*** (0.022)***
F-Stat (First Stage) 17.87 16.62 15.66 13.07
Observations 7,358 7,358 5,663 5,663
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level.
Table 7: Health-Education Gradient - IV and ADS compared
ADS-model
IV-estimate All countries IV-sample
Females -0.040 -0.026 -0.028
(0.024)* (0.005)*** (0.007)***
Males -0.048 -0.010 -0.020
(0.029)* (0.005)* (0.008)**
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and
10-percent level.
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Table 8: Robustness - ADS Model
ADS year pseudo-panel ADS w/o ENG ADS l-exp, w/o GRC
Red form Dynamic HE Red form Dynamic HE Red form Dynamic HE
Females
education -0.025 -0.011 -0.023 -0.016 -0.03 -0.018
(0.006)*** (0.007) (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
self-rep poor healtht−1 0.307 0.240 0.252
(0.063)*** (0.046)*** (0.052)***
drinkingt−1 0.017 -0.017 -0.031
(0.069) (0.052) (0.056)
smokingt−1 -0.080 -0.043 -0.031
(0.076) (0.056) (0.063)
No vigorous -0.016 0.021 0.036
exerciset−1 (0.057) (0.044) (0.045)
BMIt−1 0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
incomet -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)* (0.002)*
Males
education -0.006 0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -0.010 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)* (0.006)
self-rep poor healtht−1 0.301 0.319 0.295
(0.060)*** (0.046)*** (0.051)***
drinkingt−1 -0.011 0.078 -0.067
(0.051) (0.038)** (0.042)
smokingt−1 0.001 -0.038 0.038
(0.056) (0.042) (0.049)
No vigorous 0.076 0.090 0.077
exerciset−1 (0.054) (0.043)** (0.044)*
BMIt−1 0.005 0.014 0.011
(0.007) (0.006)** (0.006)**
incomet -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Early life
few books in HH 0.024 -0.006 0.050 0.051 0.085 0.076
(0.048) (0.047) (0.035) (0.034) (0.038)** (0.036)**
serious diseases at 15 0.110 0.070 0.021 0.007 0.021 -0.006
(0.051)** (0.050) (0.037) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037)
poor health at 10 0.185 0.170 0.137 0.109 0.164 0.146
(0.073)** (0.070)** (0.053)*** (0.050)** (0.053)*** (0.051)***
hospital at 10 -0.078 -0.028 0.060 0.097 -0.009 0.016
(0.093) (0.091) (0.065) (0.062) (0.065) (0.062)
Principal components
parents drunk or had -0.015 0.010 0.029 0.043 -0.009 0.011
mental problems at 10 (0.054) (0.053) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040)
parental absence at 10 0.047 0.029 -0.022 -0.016 0.009 0.005
(0.056) (0.054) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.039)
poor housing at 10 0.039 0.029 0.022 0.010 0.014 0.004
(0.023)* (0.022) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Life-expectancy
females 0.007 0.009
(0.005) (0.005)*
males 0.005 0.007
(0.003) (0.004)*
Observations 389 387 701 701 640 638
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent level.
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Table 9: Number of chronic diseases - ADS and IV Model
ADS-Model IV (Sample 10, lin-trend)
Reduced form Dynamic HE Reduced form
Females
education -0.057 -0.024 -0.157
(0.015)*** (0.016) (0.091)*
# chronic diseasest−1 0.413
(0.044)***
drinkingt−1 -0.044
(0.161)
smokingt−1 0.007
(0.178)
No vigorous 0.279
exerciset−1 (0.131)***
BMIt−1 0.012
(0.305)
incomet -0.002
(0.004)
Males
education 0.012 -0.006 0.080
(0.017) (0.016) (0.066)
# chronic diseasest−1 0.337
(0.046)***
drinkingt−1 -0.089
(0.116)
smokingt−1 0.045
(0.147)
No vigorous 0.220
exerciset−1 (0.198)
BMIt−1 0.041
(0.016)*
incomet -0.004
(0.005)
Early life
few books in HH -0.135 -0.133
(0.110) (0.102)
serious diseases at 15 0.067 0.084
(0.114) (0.106)
poor health at 10 0.084 -0.004
(0.164) (0.151)
hospital at 10 0.081 0.112
(0.200) (0.186)
Principal components
parents drunk or had 0.149 0.124
mental problems at 10 (0.124) (0.117)
parental absence at 10 -0.128 -0.112
(0.123) (0.114)
poor housing at 10 0.069 0.037
(0.054) (0.050)
Observations 736 734 8,602 females, 7,358 males
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent
level.
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Appendix A An Illustrative Model
Following Grossman (1972), Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) and Contoyannis and
Jones (2004), assume that individuals have preference orderings over their own poor
health H and two bundles of goods, C and B, where only the latter affects health.
The vector B includes risky health behaviors or habits - such as smoking, the use of
alcohol or drugs, unprotected sex, excessive calorie intake and poor exercise - which
increase the utility from consumption but damage health.1 In this illustrative exam-
ple, we assume - as in Cutler et al. (2003) - that instantaneous utility U is concave in
C and B but linear in H. We also assume that the marginal utility of (poor) health
declines as individual education E increases, reflecting the view that better educated
individuals have access to higher income and can therefore extract higher utility from
better health and a longer life.2 The intertemporal utility function for individual i is
given by
Ωi =
T∑
k=0
ρk[Uit+k(Cit+k, Bit+k, ηit+k)− h(Ei)Hit+k] (A.1)
where ρ is the discount factor, η is a vector of unobservable influences on U , h(E) is
increasing in E and the expression within brackets is the instantaneous utility function.
We posit that the stock of individual poor health H is positively affected by behav-
iors B and negatively affected by individual education E. Using a linear specification
and assuming stationarity in the parameters, the health production function for indi-
vidual i at time t is given by
Hit = αBit + βEi + eit (A.2)
where e is a vector of unobservable influences on H and β < 0.
1See the discussion in Feinstein et al. (2006)
2As argued by Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006), the higher weight placed on health by the better
educated could reflect the higher value of the future: “...if education provides individuals with a better
future along several dimensions - people may be more likely to invest in protecting that future”(˙p.15)
A.1
Rational individuals maximize (A.1) with respect to consumption and behaviors,
subject to the health production function and to the budget constraint, defined by3
ptCit +Bit = Yit(Ei, Xit) (A.3)
where Y is income, which varies with education and a vector of observable controls
X, p is the vector of consumption prices for goods C and the prices of B are normal-
ized to 1. Assuming that an internal solution exists, the necessary conditions for a
maximum are
UCit − λpt = 0 (A.4)
UBit + ραh(Ei)− λ = 0 (A.5)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier and the superscripts are for partial derivatives. By
totally differentiating (A.4) and (A.5) and using (A.2) we obtain that
∂Bit
∂Ei
=
−ραpt ∂h(Ei)∂Ei
∆
(A.6)
where ∆ is the determinant of the bordered Hessian, which is positive if the second
order conditions for a maximum hold. It follows that higher education reduces optimal
risky behaviors if ∂h(Ei)
∂Ei
> 0.
Equations (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5) yield optimal health behaviors
Bit = B(Ei, pt, ρ,Xit, ηit) (A.7)
Using (A.2), (A.7) and a similar expression for consumption C in (A.1) yields the
indirect utility function
Γit = Γ(Ei, pt, ρ,Xit, ηit, eit) (A.8)
3Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983), and Contoyannis and Jones (2004), use a similar formulation.
A.2
Letting Υ(Ei, Qit) be the cost of investing in education, where Q are cost shifters,
the condition
ΓEit = Υ
E
it (A.9)
defines optimal education, which depends both on health production shocks e and
on preference shocks η.
A.3
Appendix B Synthetic Indicators for Parental Back-
ground
We have built synthetic indicators of parental background by extracting the first prin-
cipal component from several groups of variables, in order to reduce the dimensionality
of the vector of controls. Since most indicators are discrete we use the polychoric or
polyserial correlation matrix instead of the usual correlation matrix as the starting
point of the principal component analysis. The polychoric correlation matrix is a
maximum likelihood estimate of the correlation between ordinal variables which uses
the assumption that ordinal variables are observed indicators of latent and normally
distributed variables. The polyserial correlation matrix is defined in a similar manner
when one of the indicators is ordinal and the others are continuous. We list below the
synthetic indicators, the observed variables used for each indicator and the interpreta-
tion we propose, based on the sign of the scoring coefficients. The scoring coefficients
are the same across males and females (otherwise, we argue, results would not be
comparable and we could not proceed with the aggregation-differentiation strategy).
Poor Housing at 10 based on the number of rooms in the house at age 10 and facil-
ities in the house (hot water) at age 10. The extracted first principal component
decreases as the number of rooms in the house (where the individual lived at age
10) increases and if there was no hot water: we interpret this indicator as poor
housing conditions at age 10 ;
Parents drunk or had mental problems at 10 based on binary indicators of whether
parents drunk or had mental problems when the individual was aged 10. Since
the extracted principal component increases if parents drunk or had mental prob-
lems, we interpret it as poor parental background at age 10 ;
Parental absence at 10 based on three binary indicators: whether the mother died
early, whether the father died early and whether the mother and the father where
present when the individual was aged 10. The extracted principal component
B.1
increases if any parent died early and decreases when parents were present at
age 10. We interpret this indicator as poor care at young age.
Descriptive statistics on the background variables used to build the synthetic indi-
cators and the additional background variables used in the baseline specification are
reported in Table B.1.
B.2
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics, baseline estimation sample (micro data), males (M)
and females (F).
Country Serious Poor Health Hospital Few books No hot water Rooms
dis. at 15 at 10 at 10 at 10 at 10 at 10
M F M F M F M F M F M F
Austria 0.33 0.32 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.42 0.48 0.37 0.37 3.3 3.1
Belgium 0.27 0.28 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.49 0.46 0.30 0.33 5.1 5.2
Denmark 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.24 0.13 0.14 4.4 4.3
England 0.36 0.31 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.30 0.24 0.04 0.21 2.9 3.0
France 0.29 0.28 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.47 0.48 0.24 0.26 4.3 4.0
Germany 0.30 0.33 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.32 0.31 0.10 0.10 3.9 4.0
Greece 0.21 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.64 0.64 0.38 0.33 2.7 2.8
Italy 0.16 0.21 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.79 0.75 0.47 0.45 3.1 2.9
Netherlands 0.23 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.35 0.30 0.05 0.04 4.7 4.6
Spain 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.66 0.65 0.46 0.44 3.6 3.5
Sweden 0.24 0.24 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.13 3.7 3.6
Switzerland 0.30 0.32 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.28 0.31 0.03 0.05 4.8 4.9
All 0.27 0.26 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.43 0.41 0.21 0.21 3.7 3.7
Country Parents Parents Moth/Fath Mother Father
drunk at 10 ment. prob. at 10 present at 10 died early died early
M F M F M F M F M F
Austria 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.80 0.71 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Belgium 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.92 0.92 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Denmark 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.89 0.90 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
England 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.89 0.89 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.01
France 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.90 0.86 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Germany 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.79 0.84 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Greece 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.97 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Italy 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.92 0.93 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Netherlands 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.92 0.92 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Spain 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.87 0.88 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sweden 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.87 0.88 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Switzerland 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.91 0.94 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.90 0.90 0.0 0.0 0.01 0.0
B.3
Appendix C Educational Reforms in Europe
In this section, we briefly describe the compulsory schooling reforms we are using in
this study. Our choice of reforms differs somewhat from Brunello et al. (forthcoming)
and Brunello et al. (2009) because the individuals in our data are aged 50 or older at
the time of the interviews in 2004/2006. Therefore, we need to focus only on relatively
early reforms. For further details on educational reforms in Europe see Fort (2006).
Austria A federal act was passed in 1962 that increased compulsory schooling from
8 to 9 years. The law came into effect on September 1, 1966. Pupils who were 14
years old (or younger) at that time had to attend school for an additional year. Since
compulsory education starts at the age of 6 and the cut-off date for school-entry is
September 1, (mostly) individuals born between September and December 1951 were
the first ones affected by the reform. Thus, the pivotal cohort is 1951.
Czech Republic In the 20th century, compulsory education was reformed several
times. In 1948, compulsory schooling was increased from 8 to 9 years (age 6 to 15).
It was reduced to 8 in 1953 and increased to 9 again in 1960. Two further changes
took place in 1979 and 1990. We consider the first three reforms for our analysis. The
pivotal cohorts are 1934 (for the first reform), 1939 (for the second) and 1947 for the
reform in 1960. See Garrouste (2010) for more information on compulsory schooling
reforms in the Czech Republic.
Denmark Compulsory education was increased in 1958 by 3 years, from 4 to 7. In
1971, compulsory schooling was further increased by 2 years, from 7 to 9. Education
started at age 7, thus pupils who were 11 years old (or younger) in 1958 were poten-
tially affected by the first reform, i.e. children born in 1947 and after. Since our data
only cover individuals 50+ in 2004/2006, we only consider the first reform for this
C.1
study.
England Two major compulsory schooling reforms were implemented in the UK in
1947 and 1973. The first reform increased the minimum school leaving age from 14
to 15, the second reform from 15 to 16. Since the school-entry age is 5 in the UK,
compulsory schooling was increased from 9 to 10 years in 1947 and from 10 to 11
years in 1973. Pupils who were 14 years old (or younger) in 1947 were affected by the
first reform, i.e. cohorts born in 1933 and after. Due to the sampling frame of ELSA
(individuals 50+), we only consider the first reform in this study.
France Two education reforms were implemented in France. Compulsory schooling
was increased from 7 to 8 years (age 13 to 14) in 1936 and from 8 to 10 years (age
14 to 16) in 1959. After a long transition period, the second reform came into effect
in 1967. The first reform affected pupils born 1923 (and after) and the second reform
pupils born 1953 (and after).
Italy In 1963, junior high school became mandatory in Italy and compulsory years of
schooling increased by 3 years (from 5 to 8 years). The first cohort potentially affected
by this reform is the cohort born in 1949.
Netherlands The Netherlands experienced many changes in compulsory education
in the last century. In this paper, we consider three education reforms: in 1942, in
1947 and in 1950 (Levin and Plug (1999)). With the first reform compulsory schooling
was increased from 7 to 8 years, with the second reform it drop back to 7 years and
with the last reform it increased again by 2 years, from 7 to 9. Accordingly, we choose
the cohorts born in 1929, 1933 and 1936 as pivotal cohorts.
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